There are ethical implications to much of what we say and do. From human rights to social justice, questions about what’s right or wrong abound in our everyday lives—at home, at work and around the world. Where do we go for guidance or perspective on some of those tricky aspects of how we ought to live?

Because we believe strongly that how we live matters, we are committed to enhancing the relationship between scholars with their academic research and the public with its appetite for accessible information.

How We Live Matters allows scholars to engage the public over things that matter to us all. You have an opportunity to submit thorny, challenging questions about the ethical aspects of daily life by emailing

Periodically, one such question will be selected, and a scholar will, in turn, respond in a short column. We will seek scholars who are not afraid to think imaginatively and who will deliver insightful responses. (One small caveat: It is CCEPA’s role to provide the forum for these sorts of critical examinations, but since we are a non-advocacy organization, the views expressed are not CCEPA’s.)

No question is too big or too small. You can ask your question anonymously or put your name to it. It doesn’t matter. How we live matters.


Q.  Is it right that academic freedom protects the teaching, research, and promotion of pseudo-science? Should it do so even at the cost of harm to public health or social justice?

A.  Approved vaccination against childhood diseases is safe and effective, or so the Public Health Agency of Canada tells us. The scientific evidence, the Agency says, is overwhelming. Were Canadian parents to stop having their children vaccinated routinely, rates of morbidity, disability, and death among children would increase dramatically.

Now if it’s true that childhood vaccination saves lives and doesn’t damage children, then anyone who creates opposition to vaccination is putting children at risk of harm. That’s especially the case for anyone speaking from a position of authority.

And yet, now and then, a university professor will raise critical questions about routine vaccination. Three examples in just the past couple years are Melody Torcolacci, an instructor in kinesiology and health studies at Queen’s University, Christopher Shaw, a neuroscientist at the University of British Columbia, and Beth Landau-Halpern, a health studies instructor at the University of Toronto Scarborough. Each of these professors has at least left the impression that the jury is still out on the question of vaccine safety.

Should professors be free to speak against routine childhood vaccination? Professors who enjoy robust academic freedom certainly are. They are free to draw from research whatever conclusions they wish, to speak those conclusions publicly, to advocate for policy in light of them, and to teach them to their students. They are free to do so even when their conclusions are false.

Nonetheless, since sowing doubt about vaccination puts children at risk of harm, should we consider it best that professors didn’t enjoy robust academic freedom?

The alternative to robust academic freedom isn’t no academic freedom at all, but rather, limited academic freedom. Claims within the boundaries of limited freedom may be taught and publicly promoted, but those beyond it may not. These boundaries are created by the scientific consensus on a matter. Issues the consensus says are alive are within these boundaries, and researchers may say and teach what they want with regard to them. Where science has settled an issue, though, to speak in opposition is to step out of bounds. Professional organizations, deans of science, and university departments of science must be granted the means to enforce these boundaries and sanction those who cross them.

Since, then, the science regarding childhood vaccination is settled, professors who enjoy only limited academic freedom may not question vaccination publicly. The same goes for climate change, intelligent design, racialist views of intelligence or ability, and many others. Universities have no responsibility to protect those who would disseminate views that science says are false. On the contrary—especially when the false views are also pernicious.

How realistic is this limited academic freedom in practice, though? Establishing boundaries and policing them will consume time and energy, and the authoritarianism implied by the idea of these limits will drive many of the best scientists out of the university and demoralize those who remain. But it could be done. Taking a page from the book of apartheid-era South African censorship, science authorities could not only ban unacceptable discussion, but also the discussion of proceedings against those alleged to have wandered out of bounds.

Robust academic freedom might not result in the kind of authoritarian heavy-handedness of limited academic freedom, but the charge that robust freedom puts children’s lives at risk still needs to be answered. Can robust academic freedom say anything in its defence?

Robust academic freedom is necessary if a university is to be a place of intellectual community. Intellectual community is why even those professors whose views are false and pernicious deserve protection.

Members of an intellectual community prize believing truly and valuing soundly, but they prize even more believing and valuing according to their own reasons. The reasons you have for believing that vaccines are safe are not your own reasons if you hold them only out of fear that you could be dismissed from the community for asking critical questions. They are not your own if you hold them in order to be favoured by your peers. Restrictions on what conclusions you may draw, teach, or speak—indeed, even the construction of limits to respectable opinion—detract from your ability to use evidence and argument to make up your mind for yourself.

When a teacher at an institution that fosters intellectual community instructs her students, she does not instruct them on what is true and false, or good and bad. That would be to engage in indoctrination, not teaching. Her task, rather, is to help her students to become intellectually competent and autonomous agents—people able to think, and to think well, for themselves. Whether she teaches views that are false is of no matter; whether she imparts to her charges the skills of critical engagement with the subject is all that matters.

Our wider Canadian society has an interest in universities being places of intellectual community and, thus, in their being places marked by robust academic freedom. A culture in which intellectual autonomy predominates and is valued will be a wiser and more prosperous culture than one in which authorities set limits to discussion and criticism. Robust academic freedom isn’t merely for the benefit of professors, but also for their students and for all of us.

That is why, in the end, even though the academic freedom professors have to criticize childhood vaccination can put children at risk of harm, professors should nonetheless enjoy robust academic freedom. Moreover, whatever that risk currently is, robust academic freedom can work to lower it. One of the great missions of the university is to help people to blossom as autonomous thinkers. If professors succeed in this mission, Canadians will be less likely to follow those who speak falsely.