Some jerk on the bus decides to entertain the crowd by rapping vulgarities at the top of his voice—and the passengers have to alert the driver? Didn’t the driver notice? And why did the passengers have to speak to the guy? Shouldn’t the driver have taken charge [...]]]> Mark Mercer, Department of Philosophy, Saint Mary’s University

Some jerk on the bus decides to entertain the crowd by rapping vulgarities at the top of his voice—and the passengers have to alert the driver? Didn’t the driver notice? And why did the passengers have to speak to the guy? Shouldn’t the driver have taken charge right away?

Those weren’t the first questions that came to mind when I read “Taking back the 95: Commuters stand up to harasser on OC Transpo bus” (24 April 2013, http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/ottawa/Taking+back+Commuters+stand+harasser+Transpo/8287329/story.html), but they are important questions.

I would like to think that the person driving the bus I’m on knows how to respond appropriately to a disturbance (that is, by calling the police, should the instigator ignore her firm directive to sit and be quiet) without my having to prod her into action. Surely bus drivers are better trained to deal with annoying riders than we civilians are, especially with those who might turn violent.

My first question, though, on reading this story, was where was the harassment? Now clearly the man didn’t mind making the ride a little hell for everyone on the bus. He was obnoxious, and obnoxious, moreover, in a way that would make people fear for their safety. But I had to read the article twice to try to figure out why the headline tagged him a harasser, and I’m still not sure I’ve got it.

According to the story, a woman asked the man to stop, but he didn’t. She asked him again, and this time he started yelling more loudly. There are elements of harassment here, but not enough to justify the headline.

For behaviour to be harassing, it must be directed at a concrete individual, it must be persistent, and it must be meant as a means to gain an advantage. The behaviour here would not seem to qualify.

Perhaps the harassment is to be found in the content of his rap or his invective. The article tells us (though coyly) that he spoke the terms “bitch” and “nigger.” Perhaps he even addressed the people he yelled at using those terms. His choice of language certainly reveals something about his character, something in addition to that revealed by his loud singing and bad temper. I’d say his choice of language made him even more obnoxious. But since harassment is not simply high-grade vexation, we won’t find it in his foul words.

Does it matter that we call him a nuisance rather than a harasser? That we describe his actions as annoying, vexatious, and obnoxious rather than harassing?

I think it does. It enables us to focus on the problem at hand, and not confuse it with different problems. In our confusion, we are likely to fail to solve our problem, if we don’t indeed make all the problems worse.

The problem at hand is simply incivility. It is the unpleasant, annoying, or vexatious behaviour that too often disrupts our day and prevents us from enjoying the morning commute or the movie or the meeting—whatever we’re trying to enjoy (or endure). Our jerk on the bus is at the far end of incivility, but he’s on a continuum with litterers, movie-talkers, and the people who stroll three abreast on the narrow sidewalk.

Sociologists tell us that something happened in the nineteen-sixties, in the middle of the struggles for equality, self-expression, and self-affirmation from which we’ve all benefitted. What happened is that in many minds boorishness became tied to self assertion. No better way to proclaim that one is worth notice than by pissing people off. And so we get our guy on the bus.

How, then, are we to recover civility as a widespread personal virtue—and to recover it, of course, without retreating to a world of etiquette and social hierarchy? I wish I knew.

We should laud the efforts of Julie Lalonde, the director of Hollaback! Ottawa, to address harassment (and violence) on our streets and buses. But it seems that Lalonde, along with bus rider Randy Fisher, who is also quoted in “Taking back the 95,” have something different in mind. They appear to be attempting, rather, to extend the idea of the safe campus to the streets of the city.

The idea of the safe campus, familiar to anyone who’s been paying attention to incidents and discussions at Carleton and Ottawa U over the last few years, is the idea of a campus on which people who belong to groups designated marginalized or vulnerable need not fear encountering images or ideas offensive to them. A woman who has had an abortion will not, on a safe campus, ever walk past a pro-life demonstration. Trans people will not overhear psychology students inquiring whether there’s a relation between sex-reassignment surgery and self-mutilation.

The safe campus is a place hostile to freedom of expression, as people free to say what they want might well say things that challenge aspects of one’s identity, and, if one is vulnerable, hearing such things can be emotionally painful or debilitating, as can any affront to one’s dignity.

I worry that Hollaback! Ottawa is out to make the city safe rather than civil because Lalonde, as quoted in the article, says words like “offensive” and “intolerant” in the same breath that she says “harassment,” as though people are harassed by what offends them or betrays intolerance. Her target is talk that she characterizes as homophobic or misogynistic, and she wants it shut down just because it offends some people or betrays intolerance. I can’t help but conclude that it’s the content of speech that matters to her, not its obnoxious delivery.

It’s bad enough that provosts and deans police the content of expression on university campuses. Do we also want the police to police it on the streets?

An edited version appeared in the Ottawa Citizen, Thursday 25 April 20103, http://www.ottawacitizen.com/opinion/op-ed/Harassment+mere+nuisance/8295937/story.html

At 8:20 pm Tuesday 2 April, just nine hours after it was erected, the free speech wall on display at Queen’s University was removed by university security guards. The guards were acting on orders from Arig Girgrah, the Assistant Dean for Student Affairs [...]]]> Mark Mercer
Department of Philosophy
Saint Mary’s University
mark.mercer@smu.ca

At 8:20 pm Tuesday 2 April, just nine hours after it was erected, the free speech wall on display at Queen’s University was removed by university security guards. The guards were acting on orders from Arig Girgrah, the Assistant Dean for Student Affairs at Queen’s.

The wall had been erected that morning by Students for Liberty, a Queen’s group concerned to raise awareness of the condition of freedom of expression in Canada. A registered student society, Students for Liberty had earlier been granted permission to maintain the wall until 5 pm Friday 5 April.

Queen’s also confiscated the next wall Students for Liberty erected, on 4 April, this time on orders from Provost and Vice-Principal (Academic) Alan Harrison.

Well, what did Students for Liberty expect? That no one would write a slur on their wall? That it would remain free of vulgarity and obnoxious sentiments? That despite the discriminatory and harassing language that found its way onto it, the university would let the wall stand?

Just as the administration at Queen’s University sees to it that offensive graffiti is removed from the walls around campus, the administration acted responsibly in having the free-speech wall removed as soon as offensive remarks appeared on it. Or so the university and its supporters say.

For my part, I think that by removing the wall, Queen’s University demonstrated that it hasn’t a clue what a university is for.

But let’s begin with the argument that the university acted well—or, indeed, dutifully—in removing the wall once offensive remarks appeared on it.

According to statements made by Provost Harrison and others, and reported in The Journal, the student newspaper at Queen’s, the poster contained hate speech. The presence of hate speech creates an unpleasant public environment for everyone. Furthermore, hate speech causes the people to whom it is directed to feel unwelcomed, which, moreover, might well affect their studies. Finally, were the administration to tolerate hate speech on campus, those whom toward it is directed might become quiet and withdrawn.

In any case, as we know, hate propaganda is illegal in Canada, under Section 319 of the Criminal Code. It is also prohibited by Section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA), which, recently, in the Whatcott case, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld as constitutional, despite the fact that it conflicts with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Queen’s might have run afoul of a human rights commission, at least, had it not quickly removed hate speech from its campus.

The first thing to note in response to these considerations is that whatever offensive remarks the poster contained, they were situated in the context of the free-speech wall. Though those who inscribed them might have meant them, the Students for Liberty didn’t, at least not necessarily. The wall was a piece of politics, or art, or theatre. Or it was an experiment, a piece of research.

For that reason, removing it against the will of those who erected it is nothing like erasing offensive graffiti. It is more like closing down a play or a peaceful demonstration or a science project, one that had already received a permit.

The argument that suppressing hate speech is permitted in Canada won’t wash, for no matter how hateful some of the contributions to the wall might have been, the wall itself wasn’t hate speech but the protected expression of the Students for Liberty.

By the way, does Queen’s distinguish between offensive graffiti and graffiti, and remove only the former? The comparison to offensive graffiti is beside the point, as the policy is against graffiti generally.

Still, if the wall contained offensive language, it might have offended people, and thereby made them feel unwanted or silenced them. Even if the wall itself, as a piece of theatre or an experiment, spoke no hate, its effects on campus were harmful and that is reason enough to remove it.

Here is where we come to the purpose of a university. One of the purposes of a university is to protect and nourish intellectual community. One of the marks of intellectual community is the commitment of its members to evaluate things dispassionately. (It is no paradox to say that intellectuals are passionately dispassionate.) To evaluate something dispassionately is to ask whether it is true or false, or good or bad, and to seek to gather, through observation, experiment, or critical discussion, the relevant evidence.

Members of an intellectual community are concerned to leave each other free to think and say and investigate what he or she wants, for the point of the whole thing is for each of us to hold our conclusions for our own reasons. Those reasons are always up for discussion, of course, but no one is to be required to hold any view.

If a university’s administration is serious about protecting and nourishing intellectual community, it will not close a play or halt a demonstration, no matter how offensive the material in the play or demonstration is. It will, instead, try to explain to those who complain how they, as intellectuals, should respond to that material. The administration will encourage them to investigate what offends them and to respond to it thoughtfully, perhaps with a play or demonstration of their own.

That, then, is how the administration at Queen’s University should have responded to those who complained about what they believed to be hateful writing on the free-speech wall. Provost Harrison failed in his duty to help students, especially those from marginalized groups, to take their place among those able to think for themselves.

Indeed, he confirmed them in their vulnerability and in their need for the care of a paternalistic authority.

That the fetus you are carrying is female is certainly a terrible reason to have an abortion—but, good or bad, your reason is none of the government’s business. It’s simply not the place of our federal Parliament to voice an opinion on the [...]]]> Mark Mercer
Department of Philosophy
Saint Mary’s University
mark.mercer@smu.ca

That the fetus you are carrying is female is certainly a terrible reason to have an abortion—but, good or bad, your reason is none of the government’s business. It’s simply not the place of our federal Parliament to voice an opinion on the merit of this or that reason behind a woman’s choice to have an abortion.

To make this point is not, of course, to applaud the refusal by the House affairs committee to allow MP Mark Warawa to bring M408 to the House of Commons. M408 would have had Parliament “condemn discrimination against females occurring through sex-selection pregnancy termination.” As Andrew Coyne has written in the Citizen, denying MPs the privilege to introduce motions and to speak in the House corrupts Parliament (“How mob rule muzzled Mark Warawa, and all other Canadian MPs,” 30 March). Less party discipline and more respect for the rules and traditions of parliament would serve Canadians well.

If Warawa wants to raise the matter of sex-selective abortion in the House of Commons, let him do so. It’s easy enough for MPs to vote against his motion and to explain why they did so.

It’s not for Parliament to voice an opinion on women’s reasons for having abortions, for human fetuses are neither in fact persons nor recognized as such in Canadian law. They are not persons for they have no interests; they lack the self-consciousness necessary for having interests, at least until late in the third trimester, and even then their level of self-consciousness compares unfavourably to that of adult rabbits and ducks. (If adult rabbits and ducks may be killed to serve the interests of persons, so may late-term human fetuses.)

Since they lack interests, human fetuses cannot be wronged. They cannot, therefore, be wronged by being discriminated against, not on grounds of sex, not on any grounds. Warawa’s motion, then, makes no sense. No fetus is wrongfully discriminated against when it is aborted on account of its being female, so sex-selective pregnancy termination involves no wrongful discrimination for parliament to condemn.

Now this is not to say that the fact that some women in Canada chose to abort fetuses because of their sex is no proper concern of civil society or even of the Canadian government. It may very well be a proper matter of concern for you and me, and perhaps our government eventually has some role to play. But no one, no doctor, no ultra-sound technician, no politician should seek to place any barrier between any pregnant woman and an abortion. If a woman asks the sex of her fetus and a professional knows, that professional is duty-bound to answer, whatever he or she fears the woman will do with that knowledge. A fetus cannot be wronged, but a patient or client denied information surely has been.

That a woman would have an abortion just because the fetus is female likely speaks to one or another social condition we should all be striving to change. The first is the belief that a daughter is less likely to fulfil one as a parent than a son is. This belief, in turn, might rest on such beliefs as that boys and men engage in more interesting pursuits than girls and women do, that they usually accomplish more of significance in life or gain more status, or that they relate to their parents in more satisfying ways.

The second is the desire to serve the tastes and aspirations of one’s husband or family by doing their will. A woman might abort a fetus because it is female not in the belief that raising a daughter would be unfulfilling, but because of her husband’s belief that it would.

What should concern us about sex-selective abortion, then, is not the abortion part, but either the beliefs and tastes behind the preference for a boy or the subservience of women to their husbands and families.

What to do? In the first case, I can think of nothing better than simply celebrating girls and women as people living rich and accomplished lives. We parents must make it known to others that we enjoy our daughters no less than we do our sons. Of course, all this requires that we work to remove whatever arrangements continue to prevent girls and women from living as they will.

In the second case, again the best approach is to lead by example. A society marked by companionate and supportive family relations will extend that mark into the consciousness of all its members. Equality within the family will recommend itself to others through its own merits, so long as it is there to be seen.

Why are these projects only for civil society, though, and not also the government? After all, our government has taken a leading role in trying to reform behaviour in connection with smoking and diet and bullying, to name just three.

Well, it’s not clear that each example is of a proper concern of government. Laws and policies that restrict smoking in the interest of the health, comfort, or property of those who live, work, or play with smokers have their place, but laws or policies that target smokers for their own good don’t. Whatever role the government takes in addressing the reality of sex-selective abortions, it must not be at the expense of civil liberties or a woman’s freedom to choose.

My point is that there’s nothing in sex-selective abortion to bother us but the attitudes towards raising a daughter that that practice expresses. But those attitudes are the private business of individual people. That puts them beyond the proper reach of government. It doesn’t put them beyond the reach of you and me, though.

Originally published in the Ottawa Citizen, Wednesday 3 April 2013

Mark Mercer
Department of Philosophy
Saint Mary’s University
mark.mercer@smu.ca

The current furor over remarks made by University of Calgary professor Tom Flanagan reminds us again how very important academic freedom is to the life of our nation. Unfortunately, it also reminds us how shallow the [...]]]> Tom Flanagan had no reason to apologize

Mark Mercer
Department of Philosophy
Saint Mary’s University
mark.mercer@smu.ca

The current furor over remarks made by University of Calgary professor Tom Flanagan reminds us again how very important academic freedom is to the life of our nation. Unfortunately, it also reminds us how shallow the commitment to it is of even our universities.

Flanagan, in response to a question during a presentation at the University of Lethbridge Wednesday evening, restated his doubt that those who view child pornography should go to prison. For this, he was dismissed as a commentator on the CBC program Power and Politics, he was dumped by Alberta’s Wild Rose party, and the president of the University of Calgary, speaking in her role as president, asserted that “Child pornography is not a victimless crime” (not something Flanagan denied, by the way).

Strangely, Flanagan later apologized “to all who were offended by my statement.” “Strangely,” because he had nothing to apologize for. He was doing what a professor should be doing—raising and commenting on a matter of public concern—and for that he deserves to be commended.

In Canada, people who are convicted of viewing child pornography often go to jail. It is entirely in the public interest, then, to ask whether they should go to jail. It is entirely in the public interest, moreover, for people with opinions on the matter to state those opinions. How else will we inquire into the matter? If anything is a matter of public importance requiring investigation and debate, matters of punishment and incarceration are.

The true job of a professor is to raise questions and to foster inquiry into them. I say the “true” job, because in many universities the professor’s actual job is becoming more and more that of the instructor who simply leads her charges to competence in some established field. Science instructors train young people to be scientists so that they may take their place in an industrial laboratory, business instructors train young people to take their place in the world of business. A true professor, on the other hand, liberates her students from authority and convention so that they can investigate the world for themselves and come to their own conclusions about it.

To ask whether people convicted of viewing child pornography should be sent to jail is to raise a fundamental question that requires us to investigate what, precisely, is the harm caused by viewing child pornography, whether it is a harm that merits punishment, whether punishing it diminishes us in some way, and whether prison rather than some other penalty serves the goals of punishment and deterrence. A true professor teaches her charges to respond to these questions with evidence and calm deliberation, and that is not an easy thing to do.

Those who think Professor Flanagan mistaken in suspecting that viewing child pornography shouldn’t be punished with jail time should thank him for raising the question, for now they have an excellent opportunity to explain why jail is appropriate. So far as I can tell, though, they seem more interested in attacking Flanagan rather than in answering him. “I’m disgusted,” no matter how strongly stated, is not an argument.

Academic freedom is, in part, the freedom to raise offensive questions and to state disgusting answers without thereby putting one’s career or livelihood in jeopardy. Those who enjoy academic freedom, then, can enquire boldly without having to be personally courageous. But why is it so important to Canadian society that some people, at least, enjoy this freedom?

Well, people on the CBC had better not raise certain issues or float certain ideas, or they will lose their venue. If you work at a bank or at a clothing store, even (sadly) if you teach at a high school, you put your job at risk if you even raise certain questions. Without academic freedom, then, there would be few if any venues for the free and fearless investigations many of us wish to make, and on which the prosperity and nobility of a society depends.

Those upset that Flanagan would express his leanings toward an unpopular position prefer a nation of enforced conformity in views and values, whether the views are true or false or the values sound or unsound.

If I had my way, educators at all levels would enjoy academic freedom. It would be written into their contracts, just as it is for university professors. Journalists would enjoy it, too. Even bank tellers (why not?). But the tide is turning the other way. The task right now, unfortunately, isn’t to extend to others the freedom to raise questions and to offer opinions without putting their jobs at risk. The task, rather, is to protect academic freedom at home.

The University of Calgary does not have a good reputation for freedom of expression on campus. The U of C has, in the past, had anti-abortion demonstrators removed and has punished students who criticized teachers. Now, instead of defending Flanagan’s prerogative to raise questions and offer opinions, as it should, the U of C is giving Flanagan the cold shoulder. Even worse, it is, through its president, expressing an opinion on the matter Flanagan raised. That’s bad, because the university is not expressing that opinion as a move in a debate. Quite the contrary. It is expressing an opinion in order to close debate.

—30—

Originally published in the Ottaw Citizen, Friday 1 March 2013

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/opinion/op-ed/Flanagan+reason+apologize/8035348/story.html

CCEPA Research Fellow Dr. David Stuewe’ s Case-Study development, examining the “Ethical Use of the Commons”, brought together a variety of political, business, academic, and community members to explore the events involved in what is now commonly known in Halifax as the “Halifax Common concert [...]]]> CCEPA Workshop: January 14^th, 2013.

CCEPA Research Fellow Dr. David Stuewe’ s Case-Study development, examining the “Ethical Use of the Commons”, brought together a variety of political, business, academic, and community members to explore the events involved in what is now commonly known in Halifax as the “Halifax Common concert scandal”.[i]

At CCEPA’s beautiful facilities on the Northwest Arm (630 Franklyn Street, Halifax), Dr. Stuewe introduced his group’s Case Study of the Common scandal which will be made available for use by business and public administration students at Dalhousie and Saint Mary’s as well as at other universities and schools.

Participants in the workshop were divided into groups; with each group given questions guiding them to think about the types of conversations that might have been going on at the time of the scandal by the major players involved: the Mayor, Councilors, public servants, HRM CAO, business interests including the concert promoter and the Trade Centre, as well as the general public.

The goal of the workshop was to explore a fundamental ethical question: “what makes good people do bad things?”

The workshop was not about placing blame. Dr. Stuewe’s goal is to have students understand the deeper structural issues inherent in any public (government) / private (business) relationship, and to have them consider how to prevent boundaries from being overstepped in the future.

It was acknowledged that we now live in a world were there will be increasing opportunities for business-government co-sponsored governance, and so, how do we insure the best possible outcomes will be identified, and followed through with transparency.

The groups, after some discussion, were then brought back together to de-brief.

~~~~~

 Haligonians take great pride in the Common, the oldest city park in Canada. The Common is a 250 acre piece of land granted to the town of Halifax by King George III in 1763. Now divided into North and South Common, the sprawling fields of grass sit just off the downtown core, and are widely used by recreationalists, strollers, and as a pedestrian pass-through.

Halifax Council decided in 2006 that the Common would be a good place to hold large-scale summer musical concerts.

It was commonly felt at the workshop that at the time of the concert announcements, Halifax felt inferior to Moncton’s large-scale concert events. When City Council first announced it was  getting into the concert business, there was a great sense of pride  amongst mainstream Halifax. Everyone agreed; it would be good for everyone.

The Mayor’s political career was potentially on the hook if the concerts failed to make money, as he had generated a lot of buzz for the project. That buzz had led to a great sense of excitement, and after that, no one wanted to burst the bubble.

Everyone, it seemed, was wearing rose-colored glasses.

The concerts, however, became a major money losing project – with the mayor acting independently to transfer public money to the concert promoter to cover his losses.

The workshop participants were  directed to explore beyond “blaming” or “naming names”, and the discussions illuminated ideas more  profound than small-scale malfeasance with bigger, structural questions emerging:

Once financial suspicions were raised, how did the “silo culture of silence” prevent the flow of information?

• Who holds ultimate responsibility in any government-business transaction?
• Why was there no transparent third-party oversight?
• How did “groupthink” impact a wish to have the “next great thing” in Halifax?
• How do politicians, and media, feed into that process?
• Does the government even have a role in concert promotions?

These are all questions which lead to other questions, none of which are easy to address.

Governance is not easy. But when structures are put in place that are transparent and democratic, ethical behavior becomes one step closer to realization.

Dr. Stuewe will now take the information gathered from the workshop and incorporate it into his on-going development of the case study.

How do we live our practical, everyday lives, if we want to live together, side-by-side, in a community that believes in diversity?

Not every-one believes in diversity. Some people are quite hostile to the idea. Many people like their communities to be homogenous, conformist, and of that Canadian social model commonly [...]]]> What does diversity mean?

How do we live our practical, everyday lives, if we want to live together, side-by-side, in a community that believes in diversity?

Not every-one believes in diversity. Some people are quite hostile to the idea. Many people like their communities to be homogenous, conformist, and of that Canadian social model commonly known as “suburban”.

So what will diversity mean for Maritimers? What will it look like?

A recent presentation by the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Public Affairs (CCEPA) “Is There Room at the Inn? Religious Celebrations and Secular Settings”, examined the contentious diversity issue of religious practice in public spaces. 

The evening brought forth questions like: Should St. Mary’s University, a secular, multicultural university be allowed to display the nativity scene on the campus grounds during the Christmas, or “holiday” season? Should Muslim prayer space be made available in government buildings? Should municipal council meetings continue to be opened with Christian prayer? Is there a war on Christmas?

This is where real diversity hits the streets. Flowery sentiments of equality and equity aside, the real question is how are we going to live with each other and our different religious viewpoints, in the day-to-day sense?

In a small city like Halifax, it seems both sides of the debate are insecure and mistrusting of each other. One side, the larger side, is just realizing that it is shrinking in size and power and hasn’t yet come to terms with what to do; and the other side is still so small, it can’t help feel that the dominant culture of religion is being shoved down their throats.

There are almost a million East Asians in Toronto. Because of their numbers, they are much more secure in their sense of community, and so might not care if City Hall places a nativity scene on government property. While at the same time, City Hall long ago moved on from an overt Christian notion of Christmas and created a fantastical Festival of Lights, which lights up the skating rink in front of Nathan Phillip Square.

For many, Christian and Muslim alike, watching kids and new immigrants first skate at Nathan Phillip Square, with people laughing and slipping on the ice, under the lights with the snow falling, is a beautiful Toronto  holiday image. It doesn’t matter if you are from Brazil, or Scotland. It’s simply a wonderful thing.

But it is quite another thing to open government proceedings with Christian Prayer, or at a university convocation.

CCEPA’s panel discussion consisted of Kevin Cox, a United Church Minister and former Journalist; Rev. Dr. Wendell Eisner, Professor of Religious Studies at Saint Mary’s University; Rabbi David Ellis of the Atlantic Jewish Council; and Dr. Mark Mercer, from the Philosophy Department at Saint Mary’s.

In one sense, there was the obvious immediate notion that there was no one on the panel who represented the thoughts and interests of any culture outside the last two-hundred years of Judea-Christian-philosophical thought. But in another sense, it was as much a discussion about religious practice in secular spaces as it was about diversity, that it did not matter which religions or philosophers were in attendance. The panel was wrestling with the more fundamental question that is still unresolved in many parts of Canada: should we separate religion from politics?

Professor Mercer was the only atheist on the panel, and the only one to strongly contest the idea that it is okay to mix politics and religion, noting that the nativity scene was a ridiculous notion for a secular university like Saint Mary’s to be engaged in.

Kevin Cox tried to argue that the nativity scene was, in fact, an inter-faith image that everyone should simply embrace. (His idea being that the nativity scene was evocative of peace and bliss – ideas consistent with all religions.)

Rabbi Ellis stressed that more inter-religious education is needed. We all need to take more time to learn about other people, and other cultures, and other belief systems. Knowledge, he argued, is the key to understanding diversity. Rabbi Ellis would later also argue, that rather than eliminate religious observances from secular spaces, there should be a fullness of celebration of all religious holidays in secular spaces. 

Professor Mercer wanted people to think about the celebratory principles of the North American holiday season – family, children, community, sharing – and see that these are the fundamental principles we should focus on sharing with our neighbours, whoever they may be. Secular Humanism is no less joyful than any other idea of community belief. Mercer argued that removing religion from the holiday season makes the season that much richer, for everyone can participate if they desire to.

Mr. Cox countered that without Christ, the holiday would be banal and boring.

Everyone agreed that all religious observers – no matter their particular religious views – should be free from hassle to observe as they wish. That this idea of freedom was a fundamental principle of “being Canadian”. All the panelists agreed that there needs to be more discussion about the role of religion and politics in mainstream society.

Religion, politics, and diversity, are going to be large and awkward discussions Canadians are going to increasingly encounter over the next couple of decades as more and more people from outside of Europe immigrate to Canada.

Halifax has been white and Christian for centuries. How it will face this challenge of religion and diversity will determine its own fortunes for the century to come.

Mark Mercer
Department of Philosophy
Saint Mary’s University
Halifax, NS B3H 3C3
(902) 420-5825
mark.mercer@smu.ca

Suppose I sit to give testimony in court wearing a Darth Vader costume. May the judge require me to remove my costume, or at least my [...]]]> The right to testify while dressed as Darth Vader

Mark Mercer
Department of Philosophy
Saint Mary’s University
Halifax, NS B3H 3C3
(902) 420-5825
mark.mercer@smu.ca

Suppose I sit to give testimony in court wearing a Darth Vader costume. May the judge require me to remove my costume, or at least my face mask?

According to the Supreme Court of Canada decision rendered last Thursday (20 December 2012), no, the judge may not, not unless she has made four different difficult determinations.

First, she has to determine whether I’m sincere in my reasons for dressing as Darth Vader. What my reasons are is not to the point, just whether I’m sincere about them.

If she determines that I am not sincere, she may require me to remove my costume. Otherwise, she has to determine whether the case is about a matter serious enough to warrant forcing me, against my sincere wishes, to remove my costume. (Apparently she may not simply consult the defendant whether it is.) Suppose she determines that the court is indeed meeting today on a matter of importance. Now she has to determine whether my testifying dressed as Darth Vader introduces a significant risk of unfairness into the trial. (Apparently just a little unfairness would be okay.)

I’m sincere about my clothing, but the trial is about something important and my testifying in costume will likely introduce a real element of unfairness into the proceedings. So now may the judge require me to show my face as I testify?

No, not yet. Finally, before ordering me to compromise my sincere wishes, the judge must determine that her order will not inhibit other sincere mask-wearers from reporting or testifying about alleged crimes.

Some critics of this decision have complained about the high degree of arbitrariness it will introduce into court proceedings. It will frequently happen that judges with the same evidence will make different determinations, for a judge’s determination will depend not only on that evidence but on what the judge cares about.

These critics might be right, unless judges regularly take court proceedings or fairness to be important, in which case all masks will be ordered off, or judges are concerned to appear sensitive to our multicultural reality, in which case no mask will be ordered off.

That its arbitrariness isn’t my criticism of the decision should be clear from my supposing myself to be wearing a Darth Vader costume, rather than a niqab. That the Supreme Court decision was about the niqab rather than any old dark costume indicates that religion was a factor here. My complaint, rather, is that the decision is a blow against both secularity and civil liberties.

It is a blow against secularity, for it privileges religious belief and commitment. Now I might, of course, claim that I wear a Darth Vader costume to trials for religious reasons, thereby requiring the judge to charge up her sincerity metre. But I’m an atheist. Okay, then, I wear it for creedal reasons. No, as I said, I’m an atheist—I go in for neither religion nor stuff that might as well be religion.

I have my reasons for testifying in Darth Vader garb, and if someone’s religious reasons for testifying in similar garb are good enough, then my non-religious reasons are good enough as well, or at least that is how it would be in a secular society.

How is it that a reason of religion gets a pass where other reasons don’t? How, for instance, is it better to mutilate a child’s penis for reasons of religion than for equally ungrounded reasons of health? How is it right for us to tolerate unfairness out of concern for religion but not of concern for other things that matter to people?

The problem, of course, is the deference to religion built into our Charter and our culture generally. For us secularists, the decision is disappointing, for it reinforces religious priviledge.

My second claim, that the decision is a blow against civil liberties, might seem paradoxical, for freedom of religion is itself a civil liberty. It is, but so, too, are freedom of dress and freedom of self-presentation. The decision infringes these civil liberties, for it renders the rest of us (insincere Muslim women, non-Muslims) unfree to testify while wearing a niqab.

Ironically, respect for freedom of dress and presentation would do just as well for sincere Muslim women as deference to religion will, and without them having to be scanned for sincerity.

The first part of the civil libertarian’s position, again, is this: either anyone may, for whatever reason under the sun, wear a niqab or Darth Vader costume while testifying or nobody may. That’s just plain equality as a function of state impartiality. The second part of the civil libertarian’s position is that no one may wear a niqab or Darth Vader costume if doing so threatens to compromise justice in even the slightest.

An objection to the idea that sometimes fairness may be compromised in service to other values, religious requirement, say, is that the mute and the paralysed often give evidence at trials, and, sometimes to the detriment of the defence, they can reveal no more by tone or expression than people behind masks can. The objection fails because the analogy is false. A person behind a mask isn’t like a person with a face paralysis but like a person pretending to be paralysed.

What it comes down to, for a civil libertarian, is whether seeing a person’s face while they give evidence really does promote fairness. If it doesn’t, then no one should be requred to surrender freedom of dress in order to testify. (I suspect most of us have our doubts that it makes any difference.)

The one significant objection to leaving witnesses free to cover their faces when it makes no difference to fairness is the openness and publicity objection, voiced by Mr Justice Louis LeBel. That people present themselves to other people openly, with their faces unobstructed, is, though, a social ideal best attained socially, and not through regulation. That I respect your freedom to dress as you will does not imply that I will not criticise your anti-social fashion choices and attempt to argue you out of them. On the contrary.

 Panel Members:

Arthur Bull: Senior Policy Analyst, Nova Scotia Department of Policy and Priorities; Andy Fillmore: Director, School of Planning, Dalhousie University; Ray Ivany: President, Acadia University; Elizabeth Mills: Executive Director, Nova Scotia Office of Immigration.

Moderator: Dr. Edith Callaghan: [...]]]> Ethics in Development: Opportunities and Challenges for Economic, Social and Cultural Development in Nova Scotia.

 Panel Members:

Arthur Bull: Senior Policy Analyst, Nova Scotia Department of Policy and Priorities; Andy Fillmore: Director, School of Planning, Dalhousie University; Ray Ivany: President, Acadia University; Elizabeth Mills: Executive Director, Nova Scotia Office of Immigration.

Moderator: Dr. Edith Callaghan: Professor of Business, and Environmental and Sustainability Studies, Acadia University

Preamble: comments and views of the Panel Members are their own and do not reflect the institutes they work for.   ———————————————————————————————————————————————–

By: S. J. Hines

    If only the economic decision-makers and politically powerful were as reasoned, thoughtful, and polite as an academic debate before a live audience in a university lecture hall. And wouldn’t it be wonderful if there were more contemplations and reflections on ideas like social equity and Human Rights, as they should be applied to Ethics in Nova Scotia public policy? Sadly, there isn’t much given over in the mainstream to such considerations – not even close – and that’s what makes an evening with CCEPA and a panel discussion on Ethics in Development both poignant and exasperating.

    Within two minutes of Arthur Bull’s opening comment that “there is an extraordinary range of narratives when it comes to understanding “development” in Nova Scotia”, I knew I was in a different universe from what is today considered “public discourse” in the mainstream media. Arthur Bull, who is a Senior Policy Analyst for the Nova Scotia government’s Department of Policy and Priorities, went on to briefly, but articulately, unwrap some of the fundamental considerations that should be reviewed in any development project.

     He highlighted the fundamental idea that development, any development, needs to be grounded in an ethical point of view. And that it needs to be more than an urban-focused utilitarian point-of-view. Development also needs an environmental longer-point-of-view. And rural interests are not somehow of lesser value than the urban viewpoint, simply because the urban areas have more numbers.

     More importantly, Bull noted, for the long term stability of the environment and for the very survival of the human species, there needs to be a “deep-ecology” point of view. It is the First Nations idea of reciprocation: that all of our actions need to be balanced with the long-term ecological needs of the world.

       Development, Bull pointed out, can no longer be based on the colonial or post-colonial model of larger economic and political powers superimposing their wishes on the weaker. “There needs to be more space for public deliberations. Not less.”

       Andy Fillmore, the Director in Dalhousie’s School of Planning and one of the experts involved in “HRMbyDesign[i]”, followed on these opening remarks by detailing how these ideas of ethics-and-development applied to the HRMbyDesign project. Fillmore said that they worked incredibly hard to create a new inclusive space for public deliberations. They held themselves responsible: first to the public’s interests; and then to the municipality’s interests; and finally to business interests.

     The HRMbyDesign committee also knew the realities of urban planning. They brought this expertise to the committee. They brought the idea that any development – whatever it is – has a cause and effect. Currently, there is little population density in the downtown core, and as a consequence, the downtown business core is slowly suffocating. The experts know that Halifax’s core will die without an influx of people and new businesses. As Mr. Fillmore pointed out, “Halifax is currently an unsustainable economy.” 

     Population density is also more energy efficient, reduces traffic congestion and air pollution, throws less carbon into the atmosphere, and has a host of other environmental advantages. There are also numerous social and economic advantages to having a more solid urban population density in the downtown core.

     It is because of the need for increased density that Fillmore is disappointed that the Skye Halifax twin-tower condo development project fell through. HRM City Council, in reflecting the majority wishes of the public (who disapproved of the project), rejected the Skye application. So while Fillmore admitted that the rejection “was a good day for democracy”, it was also “a bad day for densification”.

     Ray Ivany, President of Acadia University, built on the comments of Fillmore and Bull by examining what exactly is “problematic” about Ethics – as it applies to development. “Ethics”, he notes, “is often a discussion about virtue, which is easy as a concept of black-and-white, of good versus evil. But, in development there are many shades of grey. Sometimes governments must choose between two goods, or the lesser of two evils.” As such, relativism, utilitarianism, and detachment become the obstacles to public discourse.

     But the “common good” demands that there be an application of ethics in any development project. There must be a robust process where the collective weighs the issues through multiple points of view. Currently, there is little of this, and that is why there is so much public dissatisfaction. For Ivany, the processing question is paramount. “The process has to be more than just consultation… or the assembling of facts… the process must be equitable, allowing for multiple alternatives, and the idea of reconciliation must be held throughout the process.”There must also be what Ivany called “a proxy of a final decision”before there is a final decision. The proxy position allows for sober second thought. Finally, Ivany pointed out that the process does not end with a decision. It is on-going, post-evaluative, and needs to be continuously held up to scrutiny.

      The final panelist was Elizabeth Mills, Executive Director at the Nova Scotia Office of Immigration. She took the audience through a quick glimpse of the 100,000 visas that get processed in Canada each year. She said that the political process right now is too focused on obtaining workers, rather than with nation-building. She added that there is too much attention being paid to the money certain immigrants can bring, and not enough on immigrants as people, communities, and as potential Nova Scotia families.

     The panel then examined a multitude of issues. They wanted the audience to take away a variety of ethical contemplations for further discussion in the informal reception that followed the presentation.

     How do we find the space between polar positions?

     How do we insure “informed choice”?

     How do we make “capable” decisions?

     How do we know we have all the facts?

     How do we insure transparency of process?

     How to achieve clarity? Trust?

     What is a process of consensus?

     The presentation was concluded with agreement by all the presenters that they were fairly confident we will continue to build on our decision-making processes in Nova Scotia development. We will continue to push for equality, equity, reconciliation, trust, and honesty in our community processes. That our lives will become richer through a process of mutual respect and creating safe spaces to hear people’s stories.

     An excellent array of questions was then fielded from the audience. One man asked “if the political trend was to cut out planning and development regulators as a way to “promote economic growth”, how were we going to reconcile the economic problems of today with the environmental needs of the future?” The panelists agreed that there was a large step to take here if we are to avoid some “significant” problems in the future. Author Bull noted that we are going to have to get past our “fear of complexity” and start thinking in new ways.

     Another audience member wanted to know about the role of democracy as an obstructionist idea in development. We have all seen how it can be manipulated by political powers, or used as a reactionary device by the unqualified? (John Stuart Mill’s “tyranny of the majority”). Does democracy interfere with ethical development?

     There was a discussion of the urban-rural imbalance.

     And how do we combine new immigrants with those already here?

     What relevance does the government actually put on ethics in policy development?

      For a follow-up on these and the rest of the questions put forth to the panelists, go to www.ccepa.ca for the full video feed of the evening.

     What is clear from an evening discussing ethics and development is that we do know how we should be approaching development in Nova Scotia. We know we need processes that are inclusive, open, honest, and compassionate. But we all left that presentation, and walked out into the real world, where too many decisions come down to us from autocratic hierarchies, often from places far away from the locality affected.

     We walked out into the winter air knowing that we will be looking for ethics in development, but it will often be hard to find; hidden in that grey space within which we want to debate and discuss; hidden in that grey space between our polar opposites.

Originally published in the Ottawa Citizen, 7 December 2012

Mark Mercer
Department of Philosophy
Saint Mary’s University

Religion is a horrid [...]]]> Contribution to “Is There Room at the Inn? Religious Celebration in Secular Settings,” a panel discussion, The Canadian Centre for Ethics in Public Affairs, 6 December 2012, Sobey Building, Saint Mary’s University

Originally published in the Ottawa Citizen, 7 December 2012

Mark Mercer
Department of Philosophy
Saint Mary’s University

Religion is a horrid thing. Not just the institutions of organized religion. They, certainly, are horrid. But I mean as well religious beliefs, attitudes, and practices.

There are at least three ways in which religious beliefs and attitudes are horrid. First, because a person can have no good reason of evidence or argument for holding a religious belief, a person cannot hold religious beliefs except on faith, that is, in violation of his or her standards of belief worthiness. Religion is horrid, then, because it depends on and encourages self-deception, wishful believing, and contempt for evidence.

Second, religion involves, perhaps necessarily involves, self-abasement. In worshipping something, a person assumes an attitude of inferiority to the object of worship—not just inferiority of talents, but inferiority in worth, inferiority as a person.

Third, religion involves the attitude that all is for the best in this, the best of all possible worlds. (This must be the best possible world, as it is God’s handiwork.) Thus, everything happens for a reason, including suffering and sorrow, and is ultimately justified by its reason. But to take this attitude (again, against the evidence one has) is to be contemptuous of actual suffering and sorrow.

Now one might defend religious belief on the grounds that it answers a deep human need for meaning and purpose. But people can certainly find meaning and purpose outside religion. What religion tries to answer is a need for transcendent meaning and purpose. That need isn’t deep, though, for it has been instilled in those who feel it by religion itself. Religion, then, is the cause of the disease that religion seeks to cure.

Because religion is horrid, we should all be doing what we can to promote atheism and secularity.

Now we must, of course, act well and fairly in promoting atheism and secularity. That is, we must not violate or advocate violating anyone’s civil liberties. Among the civil liberties we must respect are freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and equal access to state and other social resources.

And so we come to that perennial topic of the Christmas season, the public celebration of religion in a multicultural society.

Religious people and religious groups should not be prevented from celebrating or observing their religion publicly. Public resources available to other people or groups should be available to them as well. If veterans or gays may parade down the streets, so, too, Christians or Muslims must be permitted to parade down the streets.

Of course, religious groups should neither expect nor receive from us deference to their ways. That something is a religious something gives it no more claim on us or on social resources than anything else has. Moreover, we should be free with our criticism of whatever it is religious groups are getting up to. Our criticism might occasionally be harsh and mocking, but religious people must accept that fact or else seek to violate our civil liberties.

Private individuals and groups should be free publicly to celebrate and promote, or propagandize for, their religion to their hearts’ content. Secular institutions, on the other hand, should not off their own bat celebrate religion. Municipal governments, for one, should not themselves be sponsoring religion.

One of my chief concerns as a Canadian academic is the strange deference to religion one still finds at quite a few universities. University administrators everywhere seem to think well of religion and to want to subsidize it. Some universities, for instance, offer prayer rooms for Muslim students when they wouldn’t offer similar digs for a card-playing or movie-watching club. Just about every university accepts student excuses of religious need though they don’t accept student excuses of, say, sporting or romantic need. Universities also always accept excuses of medical need, but a religion isn’t (at least it isn’t in this context) like an illness.

Sadly, Saint Mary’s University, my own institution, is a university marked by a very high level of deference to religion and religious attitudes. Such deference even seems part of its overseas recruitment strategy.

Two quick examples: 1) We at Saint Mary’s have to endure a prayer of invocation at commencement. 2) Each Christmas, we erect, on our own initiative, not following the request of a student group, a nativity scene on the front lawn of our main building.

While secular institutions should grant space and resources to religious groups who ask for them (so long as the institution is equally good to every other group), they should not themselves sponsor religion.

This is especially true of universities, for religion is contrary to the ethos and mission of a university. A university is a place of intellectuals and other dispassionate inquirers. We are not, as academics, people of faith. To the contrary: we value reason and autonomy of mind. As a community of people who value reason and autonomy, we cannot but be disdainful of faith. For us to celebrate a religion is for us to deny to ourselves our own best values.

Now it shouldn’t sound paradoxical for me to say that we at Saint Mary’s, and people at other universities, both ought not to celebrate religion and should indeed have university-sponsored Christmas celebrations. It shouldn’t sound paradoxical, for Christmas isn’t a religious holiday. Or, better, there are two Christmases, one that only Christians celebrate, another that everyone, including Christians, can cherish.

Christ was taken out of Christmas years ago, and what a wonderful holiday his removal created! A holiday of good will and cheer, of generosity, of children. These are fine things to celebrate and promote.

Unfortunately, misguided partisans of multiculturalism failed to note that Christmas had evolved into a secular holiday for all. Now they’re trying to take it away from us. They want only the celebration of Christian myth to remain.

That’s too bad, because a society, especially a multicultural one, needs common days of celebration. We shouldn’t be condemned to a balkanized holiday season, with various religious groups going about their different observances and nothing happening that belongs to all of us. Secular Christmas is a great idea, one that our time needs.

Why not a nativity scene on the university’s lawn, then? Because the nativity scene is pure mythology, no element of which is agreeable to reason.

—30—

“The patient must be willing to believe the story, and the doctor must tell it extraordinarily well.”- Anne Harrington on theatre, belief, storytelling and narrative.

The play “The Story of Mr. Wright” was conceived, directed and written by Christian Barry and Anthony Black of Halifax’s 2b theatre together with the [...]]]> Jasmine Smart, Situating Science

“The patient must be willing to believe the story, and the doctor must tell it extraordinarily well.”- Anne Harrington on theatre, belief, storytelling and narrative.

The play “The Story of Mr. Wright” was conceived, directed and written by Christian Barry and Anthony Black of Halifax’s 2b theatre together with the cast, five Saskatchewan artists of the Globe Young Company, and inspired by a CBC podcast by Dr. Anne Harrington. Bioethical elements of paternalism, doctor’s authority, informed consent and the doctor-patient relationship are the backdrop to a story about what we can believe. In the post-production discussion Dr. Harrington made the point that “’The Story of Mr. Wright’ is a twenty-first century play.” Being set in the fifties provides a setting for a story in which doctors wield almost total authority over patient’s treatments, creating an opportunity to imagine enacting the placebo effect in ways that would not be possible today. However the core of the play is the question of what power can the mind have over the body, and bodily diseases and experiences. Harrington described it thus; “It’s the story of our times, the power of our minds.”

The old chestnut of epistemology is Justified True Belief and the play “The Story of Mr. Wright” seem to me to be in some sense an exploration of what justified true belief could mean in relation to the placebo effect. The question of what power our minds have is intertwined with a related question—what can we know, and how will our knowledge affect us? The final scene of the play is an epilogue in which an actor recounts what he says is a true story about his uncle. He describes how his uncle was diagnosed with cancer, and then goes to see a production of “The Story of Mr. Wright”. The idea of the power of the mind to control bodily experience takes hold of his uncle, who then refuses chemotherapy in favour of focused meditation. The uncle is found, shockingly, to be cancer free, and in jubilation the actor describes running through the hospital and falling on a ‘danger’ sign; a fall which leaves him with a scar. The last line of the play is “Do you see it?” as the actor raises his shirt to show the audience a scar that is not there.

But do we see it? Do we believe it? Can we make ourselves know that our minds can cure us, if holding this knowledge will in fact make us well?

Throughout the play the cast tell micro stories. For each story the house lights come up, the actor appears to drop out of character to address the audience as themselves, and to tell a story from their life. The ambiguity of these stories, and of the final offer to show us an invisible scar, speaks to the question of what we can choose to believe.

It seems that if we can believe in these stories, and in the studies and anecdotes offered by Harrington, by audience members who asked questions during the post-play discussion, and by the actors in the play, that we would be justified in believing in the placebo effect for purely instrumental reasons. The placebo effect is well documented, and the beneficial effects of the placebo effect are only available to those who believe in the efficacy of the treatment they are receiving. Thus, it is simply pragmatically rational to believe if we can. In turn our ability to believe is both dependent and linked to the question of truth. If we believe, and if we are justified in so believing, and if our justified belief allows for the placebo effect, is our justified belief then true? And so we come back to the question of justified true belief. It seems that if we believe, and are justified in so believing, then it may be true that our justified belief creates truth out of itself.

Anne Harrington made it very clear in her discussion that she is not endorsing trickery or lies in medicine, but rather that her focus is on the elements of theatre or narrative that can be employed to make medical practice more effective.  As she asked, if wearing a lab coat leads to benefits in patient health, why not wear a lab coat? However the epistemological question of whether wearing a white lab coat contributes to curing an illness remains; it seems that it is only our belief in the story of the competent doctor in a pristine white coat that promotes our healing, and the justification for this belief is only that so believing may be beneficial to our health, and the only truth to be found is in the results that our potentially justified belief creates.